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Abstract	
	From	the	“thunderous	denunciations”	of	mass	culture	by	the	Frankfurt	School	to	the	ambivalence	of	Habermas	towards	mass	media,	 it	has	been	argued	that	we	have	moved	 from	culture-debating	 to	culture-consuming	 publics	 (Peters,	 1993).	 We	 have	 abandoned	 the	 coffee	 house	 in	 favour	 of	grumpy	cats	and	lulz.	Furthermore,	our	societal	damnation	has	only	been	reaffirmed	and	deepened	by	a	move	towards	a	form	of	cognitive	capitalism.	Berardi	(2011)	and	Marazzi	(1994),	in	their	re-spective	work	on	the	politics	of	the	language	economy,	have	suggested	that	cognitive	capitalism	has	given	life	to	a	new	form	of	crisis;	the	crisis	of	capital	today	is	not	merely	economic,	it	also	a	crisis	of	the	social	imagination,	and	language	and	discourse	is	political.	It	can	be	enclosed	by	capital.	Howev-er,	to	stop	our	analysis	there	is	not	only	pessimistic	but	also	fails	to	see	the	emancipatory	potential	within	language	and	our	media	systems.	Although	language	and	discourse	can	be	enclosed	by	capi-tal,	I	would	argue	it	can	never	fully	be	co-opted.	While	media,	especially	the	online	sphere,	are	full	of	obfuscating	pomp	and	trolling	harangues,	there	remains	a	potential	critical	spark	in	the	culture	and	poetry	of	everyday	language.	Echoing	Stuart	Hall,	it	is	the	extent	to	which	popular	culture	and	technology	are	sites	of	contestation	and	 the	degree	 to	which	 they	can	be	mobilized	 to	destabilize	systems	of	domination	that	they	matter:	“Otherwise,	to	tell	you	the	truth,	I	don’t	give	a	damn	about	it”	(Hall,	1998).	This	paper	will	investigate	the	critical	spark	that	language	and	popular	culture	can	offer	in	an	era	of	cognitive-capitalism—and	who	knows,	maybe	we’ll	have	a	few	lulz	along	the	way.		
Keywords	Technology,	language,	culture,	cognitive-capitalism	
	One	of	the	surprising	parts	of	conducting	academic	research	are	the	theoretical	tangents	you	end	up	pursuing.	This	paper,	at	its	most	un-presupposing,	represents	the	work	that	came	out	of	just	such	a	tangent—a	fun	few	weeks	 in	the	spring	of	2014	when	I	studied	Marxist	poetry.	 In	 its	more	ambi-tious	moments,	however,	I	believe	that	there	are	interesting	insights	about	what	constitutes	the	po-etry	of	the	everyday	and	whether	such	poetry	can	facilitate	the	development	of	semiotic	strategies	of	change	and	dissent.		So	much	of	our	labour	today	happens	beyond	the	proverbial	walls	of	the	factory;	we	create	value	in	the	memes	we	make	and	the	posts	that	we	share.	And	just	like	the	factory	floors	of	19th	century	England,	where	song	was	used	to	maintain	time	as	labourers	worked,	our	immaterial	labour	is	not	devoid	of	song	and	poetry.	Indeed,	much	of	our	online	immaterial	labour	on	new	media	is	song	and	poetry—from	140-word	tweets	to	YouTube	videos,	we	produce	and	consume	cultural	content	at	a	miraculous	pace.	And	while	such	song	and	poetry	may	simply	seem	like	the	banal	tune	to	which	we	labour	 online,	 this	 cultural	 content	 can	 also	 be	 subversive.	 As	 Eugene	 Genovese	 (1974)	 demon-strated	so	elegantly	in	his	important	work	Roll,	Jordan,	Roll:	The	World	the	Slaves	Made,	even	when	culture	 is	used	 to	assure	compliance	 (as	was	 the	case	 in	 the	American	South,	where	 religion	was	initially	used	to	legitimize	class	and	racial	rule),	these	practices	can	be	rejected	and	subverted.	The	gospel	song	today	is	no	longer	a	tool	of	white	control,	but	one	of	black	empowerment.	In	Constituents	of	a	Theory	of	the	Media,	Hans	Magnus	Enzensberger	(1970)	suggested	that	“capi-talism	alone	benefits	 from	the	Left’s	antagonism	to	the	media”	(p.19).	 In	essence,	new	productive	
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forces	have	to	be	leveraged	if	a	revolution	is	to	succeed.	How	then	can	our	present-day	immaterial	labour	be	leveraged?	The	answer,	or	at	least	part	of	the	answer,	rests	with	a	poetry	of	the	everyday.	It	is	nearly	impossible	not	to	scoff	after	such	a	statement,	but	there	remains	an	important	kernel	of	truth	here.	There	is	a	radical	potential	of	online	popular	culture	to	be	a	tool	of	subversive	empow-erment.	What	we	share	on	the	“Internetz”—while	sometimes	banal—can	and	should	be	seen	as	tak-ing	 the	 ordinary	 and	 “making	 it	 strange.”	 In	 the	messages	 that	we	 post	 and	 the	memes	 that	we	share,	we	are	a	public	at	play;	it	is	a	poetry	of	the	everyday.	This	is	our	gospel	music.	While	we	must	think	 and	 talk	 about	 reinvigorating	 labour	movements	 and	organization	on	 the	 ground,	we	must	also	 develop	 semiotic	 strategies	 of	 change	 and	 dissent.	 Our	 social	 imaginary	 needs	 to	 be	 re-invigorated.	And	what	better	place	to	start	than	the	everyday?	This	is	not	to	say	that	all	online	cultural	content	is	poetic	in	the	way	that	I	am	suggesting.	Indeed,	when	we	consider	 the	online	corporate	media	messaging	that	we	consume	on	a	day-to-day	basis,	some	of	 these	 cultural	 artifacts	 seem	markedly	un-poetic.2	Unfortunately,	 it	 is	not	always	easy	 to	distinguish	between	autonomously	produced	cultural	content	and	the	ideologically	charged	equiva-lents	that	seep	into	our	electronic	communities.	However,	I	suggest	that	while	it	can	be	difficult	to	distinguish	between	these	two	types	of	content,	it	is	also	not	impossible;	anecdotally,	we	know	the	difference	 between	 another	 Buzzfeed	 video	 about	 millennials	 and	 content	 that	 is	 autonomously	produced.	 Furthermore,	 cultural	 content	 is	 not	 something	 that	 is	 static.	 In	 other	words,	 autono-mously	 produced	 content	 can	 be	 co-opted	 by	 capital	 (we	 see	 this	 every	 day)	 but	 ideologically	charged	content	is	also	fluid.	Culture	is	a	process,	not	a	fixed	set	of	interpretations	or	practices.	Even	cultural	content	that	is	markedly	 un-poetic	 can	 and	 does	 provide	 an	 opportunity	 for	 dissent	 and	making	 strange.	 Citing	Glenn	Stillar	(1998),	David	Goodwin	(1999)	suggested	that	reading	and	viewing	with	opposition:			“reveals	and	calls	into	question	the	discursive	means	by	which	images	offer	viewers	‘fictitious	integrations’	designed	to	 inculcate	 ‘apathy.’	That	 is,	 criticism	should	goad	us	 toward	under-standing	 ‘the	very	real,	contested,	and	inequitable	divisions	of	 the	social	order’	strategically	displaced	in	practices	of	everyday	texts”	(p.	110).		Reading	and	viewing	cultural	content	with	opposition	is	not	always	an	easy	task.	Indeed,	it	takes	a	critical	awareness	of	 the	cultural	content	 that	we	consume.	However,	by	contesting	 the	markedly	un-poetic,	or	semio-capitalism	as	we	will	momentarily	investigate,	we	open	up	spaces	of	critique.		Language	 is	a	political	 technology	 (Marazzi,	1994/2011).	The	way	 in	which	 this	political	 tech-nology	is	deployed	depends	greatly	on	the	political	and	economic	order.	While	in	the	Fordist	econ-omy,	 communication	 and	 production	 were	 juxtaposed,	 today,	 in	 the	 Post-Fordist	 economy,	 they	overlap;	what	we	see	within	Post-Fordism	is	the	“coincidence	of	the	communicative	and	of	the	pro-ductive	act”	(Marazzi,	1994/2011,	pp.	30-31).		Language	is	simultaneously	shaped	by	and	shapes	our	political	and	economic	reality—they	co-create	one	another.	 It	 is,	 according	 to	Bakhtin	 (1981),	 socio-ideological.	Within	Post-Fordism,	we	have	a	“speaking”	and	“communicating”	production	process	(Marazzi,	1994/2011)	p.	23);	a	type	of	language	 that	 produces	political	 and	 economic	 organization	 and	 also	 acts	 as	 a	 disciplinary	 struc-ture.	In	particular,	language	becomes,	in	the	words	of	Marazzi,	“lithe,”	“agile,”	and	“aimed	at	a	pre-cise	 goal;”	 it	 is,	 in	 essence,	 “logico-formal	 language.”	 Language	 is	 not	 a	 liberal	 technology	 of	 the	democratic	public	sphere	nor	a	tool	around	which	the	working	class	can	adhere,	but	a	form	of	in-formation	 and	 data.	 In	 Foucauldian	 terms,	 capital	 and	 language	 have	 produced	 a	 set	 of	 rational	boundaries	which	define	our	cultural	horizon;	language	is	not	something	that	is	merely	expressive,	it	 is	also	repressive.	Within	 this	reality,	 the	prospect	of	 irreversibility	 is	replacing	the	prospect	of	subversion.	We	must	begin	to	rethink	Marxism	from	this	perspective:		
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“the	incorporation	of	techno-linguistic	automatisms	produced	by	semio-capital	has	produced	a	form	that	is	not	an	external	domination	that	acts	on	the	body,	but	a	mutation	of	the	social	organism	itself”	(p.	9).		Human	activity,	 especially	 collective	 semiotic	 activity,	 has	become	 transcodified	by	 the	 economy:	“the	word	is	no	longer	a	factor	in	the	conjunction	of	talking	effective	bodies”	(Marazzi,	1994/2011,	p.	19).	In	essence,	Post-Fordism	is	defined	by	a	semio-capitalism	that	has	effectively	frozen	the	af-fective	potency	of	language.		An	 examination	 of	 language	within	 a	 capitalistic	 system	must	 recognize	 its	 ideological	 nature	lest	our	pursuit	of	the	emancipatory	spark	of	 language	be	 lost	 in	a	Habermasian	voluntarism	(the	doctrine	that	the	will	is	a	fundamental	or	dominant	factor	in	the	individual	or	the	universe)	and	po-litical	naiveté.	Berardi	(2012)	has	suggested	that	our	society	is	undergoing	a	deep	crisis,	but	that	it	is	“much	more	a	crisis	of	social	imagination	than	mere	economics”	(p.	7).	Our	struggle	today	is	situ-ated	within	language	(Marazzi,	1994/2011).		Berardi	(2012),	 in	The	Uprising:	On	Poetry	and	Finance,	wrote	that	poetry,	as	 language’s	excess,	could	not	be	reduced	to	information.	It	is	to	poetry	then	that	he	believed	we	must	turn	as	it	allows	for	—	“a	new	common	ground	of	understanding	and	shared	meaning:	the	creation	of	a	new	world”	(Berardi,	2012,	p.	147).	While	language	is	infinite,	it	operates	within	finite	conditions	of	history	and	existence—poetry,	for	Berardi,	is	the	reopening	of	the	indefinite.	Like	Guattari’s	(1992)	concept	of	“chaosmosis”	(the	process	of	going	beyond	the	limit	world),	there	is	an	ability	to	go	beyond	the	se-miotic	 limit—a	 redefinition	 of	 language	 and,	 therefore,	 a	 move	 towards	 an	 experimental	 world.	While	digital	capitalism	has	created	a	closed	 linguistic	world,	acts	of	poetic	 language	can	“give	us	the	ability	to	create	a	new	human	condition”	(Berardi,	2012,	pp.	156-157).		There	 is	an	appeal	 to	 the	 idea	of	poiesis	as	a	way	by	which	we	can	enact	change	 in	 the	world.	Hemmed	in	by	everyday	discourse	that	is	given	meaning	through	hegemonic	articulation,	we	need	an	 alternative	 way	 forward.	 And	 poetry	 and	 art	 can	 help	 to	 bring	 about	material	 change	 in	 the	world.	There	is	a	need	to	take	up	aesthetic	theory	and	the	project	that	embraces	the	transfiguring	potential	of	art:	“[t]he	highest	mission	of	art	is	to	metamorphose	the	real.	Practical	actions,	includ-ing	techniques,	modify	the	everyday;	the	artwork	transfigures	it”	(Lefebvre,1998,	p.	83).		But,	two	thoughts	now	arise.	One,	how	do	we	operationalize	acts	of	poetic	language	to	create	so-cial	change	or	revolution?	I	am,	to	put	it	mildly,	highly	skeptical	that	a	poem—or	even	a	whole	son-net—can	change	the	world.	And	two,	poetry	does	not	exist	outside	of	the	social.	To	think	otherwise	is	to	ignore	the	way	in	which	aesthetics	is	culturally	created,	that	the	poetry	that	is	published	in	a	book	or	posted	online	is	a	part	of	a	system	of	production,	or	that	poets	themselves	aren’t	cognitive	labourers.	To	 the	extent	 that	poetry	has	not	been	captured	by	capital—after	all,	while	poetry	 is	a	part	of	the	productive	process	it	is	hardly	the	work	of	the	ruling	class	(what	does	big	business	care	of	 poetry?)—it	 has	 been	 culturally	 distanced	 from	 the	 everyday;	 if	 poetry	 is	 to	 be	 seen	 as	 being	‘outside,’	it	is	outside	of	the	everyday.	George	Thomson	(1946),	in	his	brief	work	Marxism	and	Poet-
ry,	wrote	that	our	contemporary	poetry	has	lost	its	vitality.	It	has	become:		 “[the	work]	of	a	small	and	 isolated	section	of	 the	community,	 the	middle-class	 intelligencia,	spurned	by	the	ruling	class	but	still	hesitant	to	join	hands	with	the	masses	of	the	people,	the	proletariat,	who	alone	have	the	strength	to	break	through	the	iron	ring	of	monopoly	capital-ism.	And	so	bourgeois	poetry	has	 lost	 touch	with	 the	underlying	 forces	of	social	change.	 Its	range	has	contracted—the	range	of	its	content	and	the	range	of	its	appeal.	It	is	no	longer	the	work	of	a	people,	or	even	of	a	class,	but	of	a	coterie.	Unless	the	bourgeois	poet	can	learn	to	reorientate	his	art,	he	will	soon	have	nobody	to	sing	to	but	himself”	(p.	58).3			
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We	do	not	live	poetry	in	our	everyday	lives.	To	the	extent	that	poetry	has	been	captured	by	capital,	especially	as	a	work	of	cognitive	labour,	and	the	way	in	which	it	has	become	something	unrelatable	to	the	everyday,	we	have	been	distanced	from	the	metamorphose	that	poetry	offers.		Despite	these	points,	I	do	not	believe	that	this	should	or	must	mean	that	we	abandon	the	spark	which	poiesis	 can	offer—our	project	must	be	 to	 find	and	see	ways	 in	which	we	can	bring	poetry	back	into	the	everyday.	It	is	only	in	doing	this	that	we	can	begin	to	mobilize	its	promethean	spark	and	re-invigorate	our	social	imaginary—this	must	be	our	semiotic	strategy.		And	it	is	here	that	we	must	turn	to	online	popular	culture.		There	is	a	long	tradition	within	the	Left	to	critique	popular	culture	or	to	see	online	activity	as	be-ing	completely	foreclosed	upon	(i.e.	 in	terms	of	emancipatory	political	potential).	From	the	“thun-derous	denunciations”	of	mass	culture	from	the	Frankfurt	School	to	the	updated	dismissals	offered	by	Jodi	Dean	(2005)	and	Christian	Fuchs	(2010),	it	has	been	argued	that	we	have	moved	from	cul-ture-debating	to	culture-consuming	publics	(Peters,	1993).	It	is	this	strain	within	leftist	critiques	of	technology	that	Matt	Greaves	(2015)	refers	to	as	a	foreclosure	politics.	Like	Greaves,	I	believe	that	we	cannot	stop	at	the	shuttering	of	the	potentiality	that	these	communicative	technologies	offer—a	new	theoretical	direction	must	be	sought.	It	is	my	contention	that	it	is	in	the	everyday	banal	popu-lar	culture	of	memes	and	“Internetz”	language	that	an	opportunity	presents	itself.		Like	Swingewood	(1977),	Bakhtin	(1984),	or	Hall	(1998),	I	believe	that	low/popular/folk	culture	can	still	be	an	emancipatory	tool	within	a	system	dominated	by	mass	culture.	I	do	not	want	to	over-state	my	enthusiasm	for	this	possibility—I	am	far	 from	holding	my	breath.	However,	 to	wash	our	hands	of	all	popular	culture,	as	is	the	pessimistic	form	common	on	the	Left	(and	seen	in	the	works	of	Mills	and	Adorno	and	Horkheimer),	is	unhelpful.	While	Marcuse	(1991)	did	allow	for	the	possibil-ity	that	our	one-dimensional	totalitarian	system	could	be	challenged,	our	ability	to	arrive	at	these	new	modes	of	realization	was	severely	hampered	by	the	forces	of	domination—in	the	guise	of	so-cio-linguistic	 concepts	 of	 affluence	 and	 liberty—which	 “integrates	 all	 authentic	 opposition	 [and]	absorbs	all	alternatives”	(p.	11).		What	is	needed	is	a	more	productive	way	of	conceptualizing	popular	culture.	Such	a	new	concep-tualization	must	not	blindly	 ignore	 the	 relationship	between	 capitalism,	 communication,	 and	 cul-ture,	nor	should	it	blindly	follow	the	fatalist	approach	of	these	left	leaning	scholars—who,	trapped	by	their	own	cultural	horizon,	were	too	eager	to	embrace	their	negative	mythologies.		Bakhtin	(1984)	emphasized	the	revolutionary	nature,	potential,	and	value	of	traditional	folk	cul-ture	 and	 humour.	 In	 the	 prologue	 to	 the	 1984	 edition	 of	Rabelais	and	His	World,	 Holquist	wrote	that:	“Bakhtin,	 like	Rabelais,	explores	throughout	his	book	the	interface	between	a	stasis	 imposed	from	above	and	a	desire	 for	 change	 from	below,	between	old	and	new,	official	 and	unofficial”	 (p.	xiv).	 This	 interface	 is	 clearly	 seen	 in	what	 is	 arguably	 the	most	 productive	 concept	mobilized	 by	Bakhtin—the	 carnival.	 The	 carnival	 existed	 as	 a	 space	 outside	 of	 the	 official	 world—a	 “utopian	realm	of	 community,	 freedom,	equality,	 and	abundance”	 (Bakhtin,	1984,	p.	9).	By	examining	con-cepts	of	laughter	and	the	grotesque,	he	showed	how	a	folk	public	sphere	within	the	medieval	mar-ketplace	was	able	to	challenge	officialdom	and	the	status	quo;	that	traditional	folk	culture	was	not	merely	a	conservative	impediment	to	progressive	change	or	something	that	could	ever	be	fully	co-opted,	it	was	revolution	itself.		Hall	(1998)	believed	that	the	starting	point	for	understanding	popular	culture	was	that	it	is,	and	has	been,	a	site	of	“continuous	struggle”	(p.	442).	This	continuous	struggle	occurs	between	the	forc-es	of	capital	that	seek	to	contain	the	popular	classes	within	a	new	social	order	oriented	around	cap-ital	and	the	popular	classes	that	seek	to	resist	this	foreclosure.	Traditionalism	is	often	mobilized	by	the	 popular	 classes	 as	 a	 form	of	 push-back	 against	 the	 re-formation	 and	 re-education	 offered	 by	capital.	 Tradition	 then	 is	 not	merely	 a	 blind	 conservative	 value	 of	 past	 prejudices	 (though	 it	 can	be—and	we	see	this	clearly	in	the	many	grossly	problematic	elements	of	popular	culture),	but	ra-ther	a	site	used	to	enunciate	a	pre-capitalistic	cultural	form	(e.g.	Bakhtin’s	carnival).	However,	con-temporary	society	has	seen	much	(if	not	all)	of	the	autonomous,	 ‘authentic’	 layer	of	working	class	
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culture	erased	by	a	“social	imperialism”	whereby	culture	became	a	tool	of	capital,	a	form	of	cultural	production	and	re-production	(Hall,	1998,	p.	444-446).	In	the	end,	Hall	(1998)	developed	a	concep-tion	of	popular	 culture	polarized	around	a	 cultural	dialectic	 in	which	 there	 is	an	ongoing	 tension	and	process	of	becoming;	all	cultural	forms	are	contradictory,	composed	of	antagonistic	and	unsta-ble	elements.	In	such	a	view,	popular	culture	should	not	be	dismissed	nor	ceded	unnecessarily	(e.g.	the	Frankfurt	School);	rather,	we	need	to	see	 it	as	a	place	“where	socialism	might	be	constituted”	(Hall,	1998,	p.	453).	While	the	way	forward	-	towards	the	constitution	of	an	independent	public	and	popular	culture	-	remains	unclear,	 it	 is	possible	 to	point	 certain	 axes	 that	may	be	mobilized	 in	 such	a	project.	The	technologies	of	mass	society	and	of	the	culture	industry	that	had	emerged	by	the	mid-20th	century	do	today	offer	a	particular	rationale	that	has	helped	to	shape	our	cultural	horizon—a	horizon	dom-inated	by	the	culture	industry.	However,	this	outcome	was	not	necessarily	determined.	Technology	is	something	that	is	contested	(Feenberg	and	Bakardjieva	2004).		Despite	the	degree	to	which	the	emancipatory	potential	of	old	communication	technologies	has	been	 foreclosed	upon,	 it	does	not	necessarily	 follow	 that	new	media	 technologies	will	 follow	 this	same	route.	While	the	rationale	that	these	new	technologies	help	to	establish	is	partially	a	function	of	 the	structuring	of	 the	economic	system,	 they	also	help	 to	disrupt	sites	of	authority	and	help	 to	create	new	centres	of	power.	Hope	yet	remains.		There	are	a	number	of	studies	(e.g.	Simco,	2012)	that	have	compared	online	popular	culture	to	a	Bakhtinian	Carnivalesque	and	this	can	provide	an	entry	point	 into	reinvigorating	a	cultural	Marx-ism	 that	 has	 been	 lacking	 from	 the	 works	 of	 many	 political	 economy	 communication	 scholars.	While	this	approach	does	have	its	strengths,	I	am	loathing	to	rely	too	heavily	on	this	theoretical	lens	for	three	reasons.	One,	the	Carnivalesque	is	a	largely	utopian	view	of	folk	culture	and	while	the	uto-pian	is	invigorating,	it	also	means	the	concept	has	limited	applicability	as	a	semiotic	strategy.	Two,	by	its	very	nature,	the	Carnivalesque	remains	outside	of	the	everyday.	It	is	something	that	exists	as	a	state	of	exception	to	the	social	order.	As	a	state	of	exception,	it	does	provide	a	critical	distance	and	an	enormous	space	within	which	the	status	quo	can	be	ridiculed	and	critiqued.	However,	this	dis-tance,	as	being	outside	of	 the	everyday,	 limits	 its	ability	 to	 influence	our	subjectivity.	And	three,	 I	am	uncertain	that	the	idea	of	the	Carnivalesque	gives	us	the	intellectual	space	to	adequately	call	out	the	 serious	problems	with	our	everyday	online	popular	 culture.	And	 there	 is	 a	 lot	wrong	with	 it:	from	 the	 homophobia	 present	 in	 the	 everyday	 language	 of	 4chan;	 to	 the	misogyny	 of	 redditors,	men’s	 rights	 activists,	 or	 forums	devoted	 to	pick-up	artists;	 and	 the	 racism	of	 lolCat	 speak.	At	 its	best,	the	idea	of	online	popular	culture	as	having	carnivalesque	spaces	and	elements	provides	a	way	to	 re-conceptualize	 banal	 and	 grotesque	 online	 behaviour	 as	 turning	 established	 conventions	 on	their	head.	However,	at	its	worst—in	the	way	in	which	its	traditionalism	reinforces	misogyny,	rac-ism,	and	homophobia—I	am	uncertain	to	the	extent	to	which	it	offers	the	potential	for	a	revolution-ary	moment	as	opposed	to	an	act	of	catharsis	or	strengthening	of	the	status	quo.							It	is	more	toward	Stuart	Hall,	and	his	notion	of	popular	culture	as	being	polarized	around	a	cul-tural	dialectic,	 that	we	must	 turn.	The	contradictory,	antagonistic,	and	unstable	nature	of	popular	culture	creates	opportunity	and	space	for	new	forms	of	political	participation—while	also	allowing	us	 to	 be	 critical	 and	 to	 check	 our	 privilege.	 This	 is	 not	 the	political	 participation	derided	by	 Jodi	Dean,	but	rather	the	participation-through-other-means	hinted	at	by	Darin	Barney	in	Excuse	us	if	we	
don’t	give	a	fuck	(2010).	Whereas	Dean	has	been	hyper-critical	of	communicative	capitalism	and	of	the	possibility	 that	 it	 can	offer	 spaces	 or	 impetus	 for	 revolutionary	 change,	Barney	 suggests	 that	shrinking	political	spectrum	in	 traditional	politics	 (while	 in	 itself	problematic)	and	the	disenfran-chisement	 of	many	 youth	 has	 forced	 politically-active	millennials	 to	 think	 about	 participation	 in	new	ways—often	through	autonomous	online	popular	culture.	It	 is	 in	these	new	forms	of	popular	cultural	antagonisms	that	I	believe	the	concept	of	poetry	can	be	re-injected	into	the	everyday.		
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In	particular,	our	semiotic	strategy	must	be	one	of	“making	strange”.	Fred	Wah	(2000),	drawing	on	the	work	of	Viktor	Shlovsky,	introduced	this	term	as	he	worked	through	his	own	experiences	as	a	poet,	academic,	and	activist:			“The	technique	of	art	is	to	make	objects	 ‘unfamiliar,’	to	make	forms	difficult,	to	increase	the	difficulty	and	length	of	perception	because	the	process	of	perception	is	an	aesthetic	end	in	it-self	and	must	be	prolonged.	Art	is	a	way	of	experiencing	the	artfulness	of	an	object;	the	object	is	not	important.”		Poetry,	by	making	objects	unfamiliar—making	strange—helps	 to	reinvent	and	renew	our	percep-tions	of	both	the	objects	and	our	social	reality	that	otherwise	might	be	reified.	The	 idea	of	making	strange	 is	very	similar	 to	Paul	Ricoeur’s	 (1975/77)	characterization	of	 the	function	of	a	metaphor	as	a	discursive	categorical	transgression.	It	is	a	calculated	error	which	“dis-turb[s]	a	whole	network	by	means	of	an	aberrant	attribution”;	it	is	a	way	to	“rediscover	reality”	(pp.	21-22).	It	is	my	belief	that	we	have	not	lost	our	sense	of	poetry,	but	rather	it	has	been	taken	from	us	and	misinterpreted,	 thus	 losing	 its	power	and	appeal	 (Thomson,	1946).	Online	popular	culture	 is	our	way	 of	 reclaiming	 the	 poetic	 and	 in	 the	 process	 re-imagining	 participation	 and	hopefully	 re-opening	our	discursive	imagination.	In	essence,	we	are	given	free	rein	to	make	strange.		Poetry	 in	an	age	of	communicative	capitalism	unites	pictures,	words,	video	and	music;	 it	 is	ar-gumentative,	 antagonistic,	 funny,	 contemplative	and	down-right	 confusing;	 it	 stretches	and	alters	communication	and	the	socio-ideological	by	 taking	an	enclosed	and	co-opted	popular	culture	and	“making	strange”.	Whether	it	is	“I	can	have	Cheeseburger	Cat”	espousing	Marxist	ideas,	to	the	“sav-ing	room	for	cats”	Tumblr,	to	humorous,	but	pointed	takes	on	the	ways	in	which	men	feel	entitled	to	space	on	public	 transit,	or	 the	online	response	to	men	that	say	“not	ALL	men”	are	misogynists	or	rape—the	poetry	within	the	everyday	is	being	reinvigorated	by	online	popular	culture.	This	is	but	a	barest	glimpse	of	a	theoretical	start	in	devising	a	cultural	studies	approach	to	semi-otic	strategies	within	cognitive	capitalism.	But	echoing	Hall	(1998),	it	is	the	extent	to	which	popular	culture	and	technology	are	sites	of	contestation	and	the	degree	to	which	they	can	be	mobilized	to	destabilize	systems	of	domination	that	they	matter.	“Otherwise,	to	tell	you	the	truth,	I	don’t	give	a	damn	about	it”	(p.	453).		
Notes		1.	 Hans	Magnus	 Enzensberger	 has	 been	 a	 provocative	 commentator	 on,	 and	 of,	 our	 time.	While	many	communication	theorists	will	be	familiar	with	his	academic	writing,	they	may	be	less	familiar	with	his	prose.	However,	 part	 of	 the	 title	 of	 this	working	paper/post-tangent	writing	piece	 come	from	his	poem	Utopia	which	remains	one	of	my	favorite	pieces	of	Marxist	poetry.		2.	Thank	you	to	my	reviewers	for	this	turn	of	phrase.	3.	It	is	worth	noting	that	Thomson,	perhaps	by	dint	of	the	time	he	was	writing	in,	omits	much	about	radical	poetry	which	is	not	clearly	easy	prey	to	charges	of	inaccessibility	or	disinterest	in	connect-ing	with	the	repressed	and	disenfranchised.	However,	while	these	strong	poetic	voices	do	exist	they	are	 by	 no	means	mainstream.	 This	 is	 not	 a	 failure	 of	 artistic	 and	 expressive	 talent,	 but	 rather	 a	recognition	 that	 the	modernist	 canon	 in	English-language	poetry	has	 tended	 to	 repress	a	diverse	lineage	of	radical	poetry	combined	with	a	conservative	stigmatization	of	the	liberal	arts	and	culture.	If	I	was	to	continue	to	work	on	this	paper	this	would	be	an	area	to	investigate	more	rigorously.		
	 	
Stream:	Culture/Politics/Technology,	7(2),	1-7	
http://journals.sfu.ca/stream	
	 7	
References		Bakhtin,	M.	(1981).	The	Dialogic	imagination:	Four	essays	(M.	Holquist,	Trans.).	Austin:	University	of	Texas	Press.	Bakhtin,	M.	 (1984).	Rabelais	and	his	world	(H.	 Iswolsky,	 Trans.).	 Bloomington:	 Indiana	University	Press.	Barney,	D.	(2010).	"excuse	us	if	we	don't	give	a	fuck":	The	political	career	of	participation.	Jeunesse:	
Young	People,	Texts,	Cultures,	2(2),	138-146.	Berardi,	F.	(2012).	The	uprising:	On	poetry	and	finance.	Los	Angeles:	Semiotext(e).	Dean,	J.	(2005).	Communicative	capitalism:	Circulation	and	the	foreclosure	of	politics.	Cultural	Poli-
tics:	An	international	journal,	1(1),	51-74.	Enzensberger,	H.	M.	(1970).	Constituents	of	a	theory	of	the	media.	New	Left	Review,	64,	13-36.	Feenberg,	A.,	&	Bakardjieva,	M	(2004).	“Consumers	or	citizens?	The	online	community	debate”.	In	A.	Feenberg	 &	 D.	 Barney	 (eds.),	 Community	 in	the	digital	age:	Philosophy	and	practice	(pp.	 1-27).	Lanham,	MD:	Rowman	&	Littlefield.	Fuchs,	 C.	 (2010).	 Labor	 in	 informational	 capitalism	 and	 on	 the	 Internet.	The	 Information	 Socie-
ty,26(3),	179-196.	doi:10.1080/01972241003712215	Genovese,	E.	D.	(1974).	Roll	jordan,	roll:	The	world	the	slaves	made.	New	York:	Pantheon	Books.	Greaves,	M.	(2015).	The	rethinking	of	technology	in	class	struggle:	Communicative	affirmation	and	foreclosure	politics.	Rethinking	Marxism,	27(2),	195-211.	doi:10.1080/08935696.2015.1007792	Goodwin,	D.	 (1999).	 Toward	 a	 grammar	 and	 rhetoric	 of	 visual	 opposition.	Rhetoric	Review,	18(1),	92-111.	doi:10.1080/07350199909359258	Hall,	S.	(1998).	Notes	on	deconstructing	‘the	Popular’.	In	J.	Storey	(ed.),	Cultural	theory	and	popular	
culture:	An	introduction	(6th	ed.)	(pp.442-453).	New	York:	Pearson.	Holquist,	M.	 (1984).	 Introduction.	 In	M.	 Bakhtin,	Rabelais	and	his	world	 (pp.	 1-58).	 Bloomington:	Indiana	University	Press.	Lefebvre,	H.	(1988).	Toward	a	leftist	cultural	politics:	Remarks	occasioned	by	the	centenary		of	Marx’s	death	(D.	Reifman,	Trans.).	 In	C.	Nelson	&	L.	Grossberg	(eds.),	Marxism	and	The	Inter-
pretation	of	Culture	(pp.	75-88).	Urbana,	IL:	University	of	Illinois	Press.	Marcuse,	H.	(1991).	One-Dimensional	Man:	Studies	in	the	ideology	of	advanced	industrial	society.		United	Kingdom:	Routledge.	Marazzi,	 C.	 (2011).	Capital	and	affects:	The	politics	of	 the	 language	economy.	 (G.	 Mecchia,	 Trans.).	Cambridge,	MA:	Semiotext(e).	Peters,	J.	D.	(1993).	Distrust	of	representation:	Habermas	on	the	public	sphere.	Media,	Culture	&	So-
ciety,	15(4),	541-571.	doi:10.1177/016344393015004003	Ricœur,	P.	 (1981).	The	rule	of	metaphor:	Multi-disciplinary	studies	of	the	creation	of	meaning	in	lan-
guage	(R.	Czerny,	Trans.).	Toronto,	ON:	University	of	Toronto	Press.	Simcoe,	L.	(2012).	The	Internet	is	serious	business:	4Chan’s	/B/	board	and	the	lulz	as		alternative	 political	 discourse	 on	 the	 Internet.	MA	 Thesis,	 Ryerson	University.	 Retrieved	 from	Ryerson’s	online	repository.		Swingewood,	A.	(1977).	The	myth	of	mass	culture.	London:	Macmillan.	 	Thomson,	G.	D.	(1945).	Marxism	and	poetry.	London:	Lawrence	&	Wishart.	 	Wah,	F.	(2000).	Faking	it:	Poetics	and	hybridity,	critical	writing	1984-1999.	Edmonton:	NeWest	Pub-lishers.	
